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THIS TOWN AIN’T BIG ENOUGH FOR THE
TWO OF US: SHOULD CONTRACT LAW TAKE A
BACKSEAT TO PUBLIC HEALTH?
Michael R. Stooksbury1
Even before the Covid-19 pandemic, Tennessee faced a
shortage of healthcare workers, especially nurses.2 Now, facing
a potential fifth wave with the Omicron variant and an
extraordinarily vocal minority refusing the Covid-19 vaccine,3
the stage is being set for yet another statewide medical
emergency; one where doctors and hospitals need all hands on
deck. One facet of Tennessee contract law stands in some
workers’ way: covenants not to compete.
Covenants not to compete, also called noncompete
agreements, seem reasonable on the surface. They are generally
disfavored under Tennessee law as they are seen as a restraint
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on trade.4 Noncompete covenants are construed strictly in favor
of the employee and may only be imposed if there is a
legitimate public interest and the time and territorial limitations
are reasonable. 5 “Factors relevant to whether a covenant is
reasonable include: (1) the consideration supporting the
covenant; (2) the threatened danger to the employer in the
absence of the covenant; (3) the economic hardship imposed on
the employee by the covenant; and (4) whether the covenant is
inimical to the public interest.”6 Time and territorial limits
cannot be greater than necessary to protect the employer’s
business interest.7
“Covenants not to compete that implicate important
policy issues are even more strictly construed.”8 In Murfreesboro
Medical Clinic, P.A. v. Udom, the Tennessee Supreme Court
tackled the issue of covenants not to compete as a restriction on
the practice of medicine.9 Dr. Udom was employed by the
Murfreesboro Medical Clinic until they decided not to renew
his contract at the end of its term, and they informed Dr. Udom
that they would enforce his noncompete covenant. 10 The
covenant disallowed Dr. Udom from practicing within twentyfive miles of Murfreesboro’s public square for eighteen months
after termination.11 Though he attempted to gain employment
at multiple hospitals in the area that did not compete with them,
the clinic would not allow Dr. Udom to work.12 Finally, Dr.
Udom broke the covenant by opening a solo practice in Smyrna,
about fifteen miles from the public square, and the clinic sued.13
The court found for Dr. Udom, ruling that “except for
restrictions specifically provided for by statute [see below],
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Additionally, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 63-1148 restricts noncompete covenants on health care practice.15
Subsection (c) applies this code section to only certain chapters
of that title, and chapter 13, which covers physical therapy, is
not one of them.16 Rather, this code section only applies to
podiatrists, chiropractors, dentists, general physicians,
surgeons, optometrists, osteopathic
physicians, and
psychologists.17
In Columbus Medical Services, LLC v. Thomas, several nonphysician healthcare workers, most of them therapists, sued
over their noncompete covenant.18 They argued that their
covenants were unenforceable based on several rationales, one
of them being public policy under Udom.19 Though physical
therapy is within the medical field, the Thomas court
read Udom to include only physicians.20 Regardless, the court
found that this case implicated the public interest because
therapists cultivate a similar “special customer relationship”
that is often found in a “medical setting with especially
vulnerable patients whose interests must be safeguarded.”21
The court found for the therapists, though they did not make
some blanket rule like in Udom.22 The court, instead, relied on
several factors, with the public policy as part of the analysis.23
Essentially, the Thomas court did not extend the physicians’
noncompete protections to other healthcare workers.24
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Under the current situation, the rationale of the Thomas
court seems a bit dated. Healthcare workers not covered under
Udom or Section 63-1-148, including nurses and nurse
practitioners, are still bound by their non-competes. This is a
restriction on the free-market principles that allow Tennessee’s
healthcare industry to allocate workers. On its face, disallowing
an entire type of provision may seem counter to the free market.
These provisions, however, restrict the free movement of
employees and often produce inefficient outcomes.
For instance, let’s say a nurse working at the Children’s
Hospital in Nashville was offered a job with better pay at
Nashville General. If the nurse left Children’s, they could be
barred from working for up to one year within thirty miles of
their former employer.25 In the setting of a pandemic, this could
mean a competent nurse could be stuck working with children,
who see significantly fewer hospitalizations and deaths from
Covid-19, when they could best be utilized in another facility
working with those actually suffering from Covid. This
produces an economically inefficient outcome where the flow
of skilled labor is artificially restricted and can potentially have
real-world consequences. Those stuck in Covid wards could be
sicker, and some may needlessly die, because there just aren’t
enough healthcare workers to go around.
Even if there isn’t a pandemic, this legal construct can
make healthcare professionals needlessly uproot their entire
lives just so they can feed their families. And to protect what?
A fraction of a percent of labor productivity slipping from one
international conglomerate to another in one of the most
profitable industries in America?
This is not just an urban issue, either. From Mountain
City to Memphis, this is a problem healthcare professionals face
regardless of setting. Such a provision can be especially
exacerbating in rural areas where hospitals can be major
employers. Leaving a job at a regional hospital could mean
commuting very long distances or leaving one’s home entirely
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just to find work. These are inefficient outcomes regardless of
the pandemic, but there is a better way.
What steps can legislators take to improve the mobility
of healthcare workers within their communities? The Tennessee
General Assembly should amend Tennessee Code Annotated
Section 63-1-148 to include all healthcare workers, but
especially nurses and nurse practitioners. Such a measure
would not unilaterally solve Tennessee’s shortage, but it would
go a long way in better allocating the state’s vital resource of
healthcare workers.

